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R. Carl Moy* 
THE INTERPRETATION OF MEANS 
EXPRESSIONS DURING PROSECUTION 
This type of encounter is familiar to many patent prac-
titioners: An attorney is discussing a newly submitted claim, 
which contains a "means plus function" expression as 
described in the sixth paragraph of 35 U .S.c. § 1121, with an 
examiner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO). The attorney points out that the prior art does not 
contain the recited "means," say for example, "means for 
travelling through space. " The examiner responds with the 
assertion that the new claim is anticipated by a reference 
already of record which discloses a shoe, observing that 
"this shoe could travel through space if it were launched 
upward fast enough, and so your means expression reads 
on the reference."2 
The scope assigned to means expressions by the PTO 
during prosecution is of considerable importance, given the 
widespread use of such expressions by patent practitioners. 
The PTO's approach to their interpretation may be unduly 
restrictive in view of the literal language of the statute, and 
has the effect of forcing an applicant to address prior art 
having no reasonable relationship to the subject matter that 
would be protected by such an expression after issuance. 
Recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit suggest that the previously existing law 
in this area may no longer be valid. Those decisions suggest 
means expressions are to be interpreted during validity 
determinations exactly as in infringement questions. 
*Merchant, Gould, Smith, Edell, Welter & Schmidt, Minneapolis, Minn. The 
views expressed herein are entirely those of the author. 
1 "An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means for 
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts 
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding 
structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." 
35 U.S.C. §112 (1982). While the language of the paragraph, by referring to "struc-
ture, material, or acts," clearly is not intended to be limited to claims drawn to 
inventions in any particular category of 35 U.S.C. Section 101, this article will 
discuss the use of such language in claims drawn to articles of manufacture, 
primarily for ease of illustration. 
2 This fanciful example was offered by an Associate Solicitor during oral argu-
ment before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to illustrate 
the PTO's view of how the scope of such expressions is determined. 
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This article briefly explains how the scope of a claim 
including a means expression is determined both under the 
PTO view and a strict application of the statutory language. 
The lack of consensus and current state of the law in the 
area are illustrated through an analysis of several recent 
decisions ofthe Federal Circuit. The policies underlying the 
PTO and statutory methods of interpreting means expres-
sions during prosecution are examined in an effort to dem-
onstrate that the statutory method more effectively furthers 
the policies underlying the patent system. 
I. 
THE PTO AND STATUTORY METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 
The use of functional language in patent claims to define 
elements of an invention is very old. Prior to the enactment 
of the Patent Act of 1952 (the '52 Act), these recitations 
were generally understood to result in coverage, as to the 
element so defined, broad enough to encompass all elements 
capable of performing the recited function. 3 They were con-
sequently used by practitioners to describe a portion of an 
invention in terms that would result in a broad exclusive 
right. 
This broad coverage, however, often ran afoul of other 
perceived statutory limits on the scope of a patentee's exclu-
sive rights. Since such an expression covered all possible 
means of achieving the recited result, it was argued, how 
could they particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
invention,4 or be supported by an enabling disclosure?S This 
view is typified by the Supreme Court's decision in Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,6 in which claims 
found to use "conveniently functional language at the exact 
point of novelty"7 were held to be invalid as indefinite. 
3 Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928); Morse v. 
Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). See generally 2 D. Chisum, Patents § 8.04 
(1983). 
4 Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928); Morse v. 
Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
5 General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 37 USPQ 466 
(1938). 
6 329 U.S. 1,71 USPQ 175 (1946). 
7 [d. at 8, 71 USPQ at 178 (quoting General Electric v. Wabash Appliance, 304 
U.S. 364, 371, 37 USPQ 466, 469). 
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The sixth paragraph of35 U.S.C. §1128 was included in 
the Patent Act of 1952 to ameliorate the results flowing from 
Halliburton/ by explicitly authorizing the use of functional 
language in patent claims drawn to a combination, provided 
that the function is used to describe the ability ofa "means" 
for its performance. Under the language of that paragraph, 
a claim expressing an element in a combination as a means 
for performing a specified function is defined as covering 
"the corresponding structure ... described in the specifi-
cation and equivalents thereof. " 
The analysis employed when applying the statutory lan-
guage to claims including a means expression can be illus-
trated by brief examination of Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor. 10 
In that case, the patentee had alleged infringement of claims 
drawn to an apparatus for detecting irregularities in the 
thickness of rust preventative layers coating the outside of 
pipes. The prior art had settled on the method of utilizing 
the electrical insulating properties of the coating by wrap-
ping a coil spring in an annulus about the circumference of 
the pipe. When a large voltage difference was applied between 
the spring and the pipe, variations in the thickness of the 
insulation could be electrically detected when the spring 
was dragged along the length of the pipe. 
This system, however, suffered from a loss of accuracy 
as the spring inevitably separated from the insulation due to 
the uneven "pull" applied to various points of the spring by 
its supporting frame. The patentee solved this problem by 
devising an apparatus in which the spring was rolled, rather 
than dragged, along the insulation layer. The movement was 
much smoother, and the accuracy of detection correspond-
ingly increased. The mechanism that was disclosed in the 
specification for performing this function comprised a pusher 
that included sets of rollers in contact with the outside diam-
eter of the annular spring. The spring was held against the 
8 At the time of enactment there were only three paragraphs in section 112. 
Three additional paragraphs were inserted by Public Law No. 94-131, Section 7, 
89 Stat. 685, 691 (Nov. 14, 1975) to authorize multiply-dependent claim practice. 
The original third paragraph thereby became the sixth. 
9 See notes 32 and 101, infra, and accompanying text. 
!O 252 F.2d 589, 116 USPQ 222 (9th Cir. 1957). 
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pipe by being seated between the sets of rollers, so that 
when the pusher was moved along the axis of the pipe, the 
spring rotated down the pipe's length. 
The claims recited this mechanism as a "means rotat-
ably engaging and forming a movable electrical contact with 
[the] spring at a position remote from the surface of the 
[pipe] for connecting said spring to a high voltage testing 
circuit and for rolling said spring along such [pipe]." 11 
The accused device also used a rolling annular spring 
to detect imperfections in insulative coatings of pipes. How-
ever, instead of driving the spring by a wheeled pusher, the 
accused device moved the spring along the length ofthe pipe 
by a set of nonrotating pushers each having contacts closely 
conforming to the coil diameter of the spring. The makers 
of the accused device argued that the claims did not cover 
their configuration since the patent disclosed only a wheeled 
pusher. This contention was bolstered, they urged, by tes-
timony of the inventor to the effect that he had considered 
using non-wheeled pushers similar to the accused device 
prior to executing his application, and discarded them as 
inferior. 
The Court in Stearns disagreed. It noted the statutory 
language of § 112's last paragraph, and construed that section 
to mean "that while an element in a claim for a combination 
may be expressed as a means ... for performing a function 
without recital of structure ... in support thereof; the struc-
ture ... must be described in the specification, and if so 
described, the claim will be construed to cover that which 
is described and the equivalent thereof." Therefore, the 
Court concluded, "the structure [corresponding to the recited 
function] need not as well be recited in the claim" to form 
a limitation. Since the corresponding structure in the paten-
tee's specification clearly did not include non-wheeled push-
ers, "[t]he question then becomes whether the rollers or 
wheels shown in the specification ... are equivalent to the 
... pusher-contactor of [the accused device]. "12 
11 [d. at 592, 116 USPQ at 224. 
12 [d. at 598, 116 USPQ at 228 (emphasis in original). 
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The court answered this question by observing that 
"both [the patented and accused devices] rotatably engage 
the spring electrode so as to roll it along the pipe while 
maintaining electrical contact between the spring electrode 
and the high voltage unit." Consequently, and in view of 
the district court's statements that the pushers "do substan-
tially the same work" and "produce substantially the same 
result," the court held that "the wheels or rollers employed 
in [the patented device] are equivalent to the sleeve bearing 
used in [the accused] device."13 The claims were therefore 
held to be infringed. 
While not cited at this point, the reasoning employed 
by the court in Stearns clearly mirrors the often usedl4 for-
mulation of the doctrine of equivalents enunciated in Graver 
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 15 in 
which the Supreme Court stated that "a patentee may invoke 
this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if 
it performs substantially the same function in substantially 
the same way to produce the same result' "16 as the patented 
subject matter. Briefly, under this test an accused device 
must simultaneously satisfy all three requirements of (i) 
performing substantially the same function as the corre-
sponding structure in the specification, (ii) in substantially 
the same way as that structure, (iii) to produce the same 
result. A failure to satisfy anyone of these requirements will 
result in a finding that the accused device is outside the 
claims's scope. 17 
13 Id. 116 USPQ at 228-229. 
14 E.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969,226 USPQ 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 221 USPQ 657 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Co. 724 F.2d 951, 
220 USPQ 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 127 (1984); Hughes Aircraft 
v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1351, 219 USPQ 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Berea, S.P.A., Etc., 714 F.2d 1110,219 USPQ 185 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
15 339 U.S. 605, 85 USPQ 328 (1949). 
16 Id. at 608, 85 USPQ at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 
280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 USPQ 40, 44 (1929) ). 
17 Bolkom v. The Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 187 USPQ 466 (6th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45, 
181 USPQ 685 (6th Cir. 1974); Blaw-Knox Co. v. Hartsville Oil Mill, 394 F.2d 877, 
157 USPQ 475 (4th Cir. 1968); Bullard Co. v. General Electric Co., 348 F.2d 985, 
146 USPQ 141 (4th Cir. 1965). 
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The Court in Stearns was dealing with a question of 
infringement, not validity, and until recently cases strictly 
applying the statutory language of the sixth paragraph of 
section 112 in validity questions were rare. 18 This is undoubt-
edly because the PTO and Federal Circuit precedents, as 
discussed below, have historically treated means expres-
sions during prosecution without regard to the statutory 
language. 
On those occasions when the language of the sixth para-
graph is used to interpret a claim's scope during validity 
determinations, the method is very similar to that used by 
the Court in Stearns. 19 When a court, confronted with a 
combination claim including a recitation of a means for per-
forming a specified function, decides to apply the statutory 
language, it ascertains what structure in the specification 
corresponds to the function recited in the claim and com-
pares that structure to the relevant prior art. If the court 
determines that the corresponding structure is both novel 
and unobvious, the question then is whether the prior art 
discloses or makes obvious any equivalents of that corre-
sponding structure. Just as in infringement determinations, 
the determination of equivalents during prosecution is the 
same as, or at least closely parallel to , that in Graver Tank: 
Does the prior art disclose or make obvious a device that 
performs substantially the same function as the correspond-
ing structure in the specification, in substantially the same 
way, to obtain the same result? 
The paradigm applied by the PTO to means expressions 
is quite different. The space shoe illustration offered above 
highlights the PTO practice of disregarding the statutory 
language when determining the scope of claims including a 
means-plus-function expression. 
Instead, the PTO has continued to interpret the scope 
of these expressions in a manner very similar to the standard 
18 Only two such cases are known to the author to have applied this standard 
prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. They are Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City 
of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162 (6th Cir. 1983), discussed infra, and 
Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 193 USPQ 257 (4th CiL), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977). 
19 See id. 
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prevailing before the '52 Act. The PTO's position is that 
only the literal language of the means expression is limiting 
during prosecution. A Claim including a means expression 
therefore, under the PTO's view, encompasses, or "reads 
on," every means for achieving the recited function. 20 Every 
structure or device that performs the recited function antic-
ipates the means expression, regardless of what correspond-
ing structure is disclosed in the specification or what its 
equivalents are. 
A problem surfaces with the PTO view when the prior 
art disclosure under consideration contains structure that 
would be adequate to perform the recited function, but does 
not disclose or make obvious its actual performance. Many 
examiners are reluctant to allow a claim drawn to an appa-
ratus based solely on the absence of a teaching of how that 
apparatus is to be used. This reluctance is reinforced by a 
line of Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)21 deci-
sions enunciating the well settled rule that recitations of 
intended use cannot impart patentability to an otherwise 
unpatentable claim drawn to an apparatus. 22 
The PTO corrects this anomaly by expanding the art 
that will anticipate the recited means expression to include 
any disclosure containing structure capable of performing 
the recited function. This is the basis for the examiner's 
position in the example at the beginning of this article that 
the recitation of a "means for travelling through space" 
only requires the application of a reference disclosing a shoe, 
since that shoe is capable of travelling through space. 
20 E.g., Ex parte Coady, 172 USPQ 83 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1970) (" 'Means' 
covers all means capable of performing the stated function, and is not limited to 
the structure disclosed in the application. "); Ex parte Machlanski, 111 USPQ 459 
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959). See also P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals ch. 
4, Sec. 4 (1975); Commentaria, Functional Claims, 37 JPOS 753 (1955). For a 
recent description of the PTO view, see Manzo, Means Claims in Patent Infringe-
ment Litigation, 68 J.P.O.S. 97, 110-11 (March 1986). 
21 The decisions of the CCPA and the Court of Claims are precedents in the 
Federal Circuit. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 215 USPQ 657 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982). 
22 E.g., In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA 1974); In re Mason, 
240 F.2d 362, 114 USPQ 127 (CCPA 1957); In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947,99 USPQ 
123 (CCPA 1953). The PTO has indicated its acceptance of this view in its Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure Section 706.03(c) (5th ed. 1983). 
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II. 
PRE-FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAw 
Shortly after the enactment of the '52 Act, it was sug-
gested that the language of the last paragraph of section 112 
prescribed the method of interpreting means expressions 
during both infringement and validity determinations.23 About 
this same time, attempts were made to secure the allowance 
of means expressions by arguing that the statute now com-
pelled a narrow interpretation. 24 
The first of these cases to be ruled on by the CCP A was 
In re Arbeit.25 The applicants in Arbeit were attempting to 
claim a glass-making furnace which carried molten glass 
sequentially from one portion ofthe furnace to another through 
conduits that were small enough to prevent any backflow. 
They relied on the following claim language to overcome a 
prior art rejection: 
[C]onduit means having a flow rate related to the flow rate [of 
finished glass withdrawn from the furnace] so that the normal 
operation [of the furnace] produces in the conduit means a glass 
velocity having a minimum in the range from several mm to 1 cm 
per second.26 
It was the PTO's opinion that this language was a statement 
of operation, defining no "positive structure by which the 
claims may be distinguished from the prior art. The flow 
rate is not structure. "27 
On appeal, the CCPA viewed the applicants as con-
tending that "under the phraseology of the last paragraph 
[of section 112], it is proper to look to purely functional 
limitations expressed in claims for novelty to support patent-
ability." It viewed the Solicitor as taking "a position which, 
in our opinion, if adopted, requires a holding that in cases 
23 E.g., Commentaria, Functional Claims, 37 J.P.O.S. 753 (1955). 
24 E.g., In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 113 U.S.P.Q. 530 (CCPA 1957); In re 
Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947, 99 U.S.P.Q. 123 (CCPA 1957). See Ex parte Ball, 99 U.S.P.Q. 
146 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953). 
25 206 F.2d 947, 99 USPQ 123 (CCPA 1953). 
26 206 F.2d at 948, 99 USPQ at 124. 
27 Id. at 951,99 USPQ at 127. 
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where purely functional limitations constitute the sole mat-
ter relied upon for novelty, the phraseology . . . has no 
application, and the matter is governed by the first and 
second paragraphs. "28 
After observing that under prior law, functional lan-
guage could not be solely relied upon for patentability, the 
Court addressed the effect the last paragraph of then newly 
enacted section 112 had on its conclusion. "It seems obvious 
to us that the construction of that paragraph, such as appel-
lant contends for, would render it wholly inconsistent with 
the first and second paragraphs which ... are explicit and 
mandatory in requiring a written description expressed in 
'full, clear, concise, and exact terms' in the specification, 
and so set forth in the claims.' '29 In other words, despite the 
language of the last paragraph of section 112, the applicant's 
means expression continued to read on all structures capable 
of performing the recited function. The rejection was there-
fore affirmed. 
The issue was addressed even more squarely in In re 
Lundberg,30 where the applicants contended both that (1) 
their claim language describing a support holding an instru-
ment in an airplane as "adapted automatically to stabilize 
[the instrument] in relation to the level and orientation 
regardless of motions of the airplane" was equivalent to a 
recitation of a means for performing the function, and (2) as 
such, the language had to be construed as limited to the 
corresponding structure described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof. 
The Court agreed to assume that the "adapted" lan-
guage was equivalent to the statutory language of a means 
plus function and found that the function recited was present 
in the prior art. 
Therefore, unless the ... third [now sixth] paragraph of § 112 is 
to be construed to mean that ... the claims may, through the 
medium of a "means" clause, be held to include the limitations 
which comprise said means and which are set forth in the disclo-
28 Id. at 956, 99 USPQ at 130. 
29 Id. at 958,99 USPQ at 131 (emphasis in original). 
30 244 F.2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957). 
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sure, we must reject appellants' contentions as to the effect of 
§1l2 on the claims in this case. 31 
The Court decided against the applicants, rejecting their 
second contention for two reasons. First, after recognizing 
that the authorizing of means expressions was designed to 
introduce a greater amount of liberality in the use of func-
tional expressions in the wake of Halliburton, 32 it stated 
that "Congress did not intend, by incorporating the [last] 
paragraph into § 112, to destroy certain basic precepts of 
patent law. "33 It then found that the second paragraph, by 
directing that the claims "particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim the subject matter" sought to be patented, 
continued to require that the claims themselves literally 
define the invention, citing Arbeit. 34 
Second, the court observed that patent applicants are 
free to present claims of varying breadth during prosecution. 
It is at once obvious that appellant's intended construction of the 
phrase under consideration would eliminate the distinction between 
a combination claim whose elements are recited broadly as means 
for performing a specified function and a combination claim in 
which the same elements are recited in detail 
since incorporating the corresponding structure described 
in the specification into the means expression would make 
the coverage afforded by these two claims effectively indis-
tinguishable. 35 
The Court then held that the literal language of the 
claims must support patentability "without limitations 
imported from the specification, whether such language is 
couched in terms of means plus function or consists of a 
detailed recitation of the inventive [claimed] matter. "36 
Following these precedents, the PTO has developed a 
long line of decisions37 that refuse to apply the statutory 
31 244 F.2d at 547,113 USPQ at 533. 
32 See Ex parte Bal/, 99 USPQ 146 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953). 
33 244 F.2d at 547,113 USPQ at 534. 
341d. 
35 ld. at 548, 113 USPQ at 534. 
36 ld. 
37 See footnote 20, supra. 
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language. These cases often announce and apply the rule 
with little or no discussion of the merits of either side. 
III. 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
As alluded to briefly at the beginning of this article, the 
continued viability of the PTa's approach to means expres-
sions has been called into question by recent decisions of 
the Federal Circuit. These decisions reveal the Federal Cir-
cuit's uncertainty over what interpretive method should be 
used to ascertain the scope of means expressions during 
prosecution and validity determinations. 
The first opinion of the Federal Circuit discussing this 
issue, In re MulderS suggested that the PTa standard was 
incorrect. There, the Federal Circuit was faced with the 
question whether to affirm the PTa's rejection of a claimed 
invention as obvious over the prior art. The invention was 
a particular form of an integrated injection logic circuit. 
These circuits contain many logic gate circuits, each gate 
circuit comprising one NPN and one PNP-type transistor. 
Since the collector of each transistor in a particular gate 
circuit is connected with the base of the other, portions of 
the transistors can share common regions of the doped sem-
iconductor material out of which they are formed. A prin-
cipal object of the invention in Mulder was to arrange the 
semiconductor material in a manner that facilitated the use 
of computer-aided design techniques. 
The applicants had chosen to formulate dependent claim 
9 to include a recitation of' 'means to reduce the input series 
resistance of the gate circuits." The PTa asserted that the 
arrangement disclosed in one of the applied references com-
prised such means. 
The Court paused to dwell on the rejection of this 
dependent claim and its means expression only briefly in its 
opinion. "With respect to claim 9, we note that it is drafted 
in 'means plus function' format, so that it is 'construed to 
cover the corresponding structure. . . described in the spec-
ification, and equivalents thereof.' "39 This appears to be a 
38 716 F.2d 1542, 219 USPQ 189 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
39 [d. at 1549, 219 USPQ at 196. 
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strict application of the statutory language along the lines 
advocated in this article. No authority beyond the statute 
was cited for the position. 
However, the Court found that the narrower scope 
assigned to the claim did not save it. "Appellants have 
neither asserted nor shown that the [prior art] structure is 
not the equivalent of the structure disclosed in their speci-
fication. "40 Consequently, the rejection was affirmed. 
In its next opinion on the topic, the Federal Circuit 
expressly used the PTO's approach to determine the scope 
of a means expression. This was in RCA Corp. v. Applied 
Digital Data Systems, 41 where the court reviewed a district 
court's determination that certain claims of an issed patent 
were anticipated by the prior art. The invention in RCA 
involved a system for making character spaces on a televi-
sion screen display given characters in response to digital 
symbol codes representing a message. Each character space 
of the television screen was comprised of a dot matrix, the 
individual dots within each matrix being defined by positions 
along horizontal scan lines. By using "position counts" to 
specify the position of the dot being addressed, the electron 
scanning beam of the television was turned on and off at 
appropriate points, illuminating selected dots of the matrix 
to display the given character. 
Claim 1 of the patent recited four means-pIus-function 
elements, one ofthem being "means for generating position 
counts which occur successively during a scan along a scan-
line through a character space. "42 
The asserted prior art was also a system for generating 
characters on a cathode ray tube. In that system, the elec-
tron beam of the cathode ray tube was turned on and off by 
electrical signals from a yoke that physically traversed a line 
of cores in unison with the electron beam. By "reading" the 
electromagnetic pattern of the cores, a corresponding pat-
tern was produced on the television screen. 
40 [d. 
41 730 F.2d 1440, 221 USPQ 385 (Fed. Gr.), cert. dismissed, 105 S.Ct. 32 
(1984). 
42 [d. at 1445,221 USPQ at 387. 
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In deciding the issue of anticipation, the Court first 
described what it felt to be the correct legal standard to be 
applied by a district court determining validity. "[W]ith an 
element expressed in terms of a means plus function, 'absent 
structure [in a prior art reference] which is capable of per-
forming the functional limitation of the 'means', [the prior 
art reference] does not meet the claim.' "43 This language is 
a reiteration of the PTO view, holding that only the literal 
language of the means expression is limiting when determin-
ing validity. As the Court stated in a footnote: "The claims 
have defined the invention in terms of several 'means-plus-
function' elements. The limitations which must be met by 
an anticipating reference are those set forth in each state-
ment of function."44 
The Court then determined that the prior art device was 
not an anticipation. "The yokes do not keep track of the 
position of any counts. Most importantly, the yokes do not 
generate position counts as specifically required in claim 
1. "45 Therefore, the Court concluded, the yokes ofthe prior 
art device' 'do not meet the limitations of this means, since 
they do not function in substantially the same way as a 
position count generating means. "46 
The Federal Circuit's next encounter with the PTO's 
method of interpreting means expressions took place in the 
context of an appeal from a decision of the PTO' s Board of 
Appeals that had held certain claims in an application antic-
ipated under 35 U.S.C. §102. The applicants in In re Boersma47 
had, after receiving a decision from the Board of Appeals 
giving their means expressions the traditional broad PTO 
interpretation, asked the Board to reconsider and clarify its 
affirmance of the examiner's rejection, arguing that the lan-
guage of the last paragraph of section 112 compelled the 
narrow, statutory interpretation, and that under such an 
interpretation the claims were patentable. 
43 Id. at 1444, 221 USPQ at 388 (citing In re Mott, 557 F.2d 266, 269,194 USPQ 
305,307 (CCPA 1977) ) (insertions in original). 
44 Id. at 1445,221 USPQ 389, footnote 5. 
45 Id. (emphasis in original). 
46 Id., 221 USPQ at 388 (footnote omitted). 
47 No. 84-627 (May 4,1984) (unpublished). See summary at 28 P.T.C.J. 83 (May 
24, 1984). 
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The Board refused to change its decision, observing 
that "[the last paragraph] of Section 112 relates to matters 
of infringement, not the interpretation of claims during ex 
parte prosecution.' '48 
Before the Federal Circuit, the applicants in Boersma 
continued to urge that the statutory language compelled a 
narrow interpretation of the means expressions.49 The appli-
cants admitted that Lundberg had squarely decided the 
question against them,50 but contended that that case was 
wrong as a matter of law. 
The Court affirmed the Board in an unpublished deci-
sion. It observed that Lundberg did indeed stand for the 
opposite rule oflaw urged by the applicants, and that "[t]he 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals repeatedly followed 
and applied" that rule. 51 It noted that the Federal Circuit 
had previously applied the PTO standard in RCA, and 
observed: "Appellants admitted at oral argument that Lund-
berg supports the Board's decision in this case. They argued 
only that Lundberg is wrong. Be that as it may, Lundberg 
binds this panel. "52 
Perhaps the best example ofthe Federal Circuit's uncer-
tainty over this question is a fourth case, Stewart-Warner 
Corp. v. City of Pontiac53 in which the Court was faced with 
an appeal from a district court judgment invalidating a patent 
as obvious in view of the prior art. 
The litigation in Stewart-Warner has a relatively com-
plex history. The case involved Stewart-Warner Corp.'s 
attempts to enforce two patents directed to stadium score-
boards. The accused infringer asserted that both patents 
were invalid based on a number of prior art grounds, includ-
ing a public use or sale under 35 U.S.C. §102(b). In a first 
trial, limited to the issues of public use or sale, the district 
court found both inventions to be anticipated.54 
48 [d., slip op. at 3 (insertions in original). 
49 [d. 
50 [d., slip op. at 4. 
51 [d. 
52 [d., slip op. at 4-5. 
53 767 F.2d 1563,226 USPQ 676 (1985). 
54 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 213 USPQ 453 (E.n. Mich. 1981). 
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Stewart-Warner's appeal from the judgment went to the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court not yet having 
been divested of jurisdiction over the case by the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982.55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the invalidity of one patent. Because of an admission by the 
patent owner, whether the second patent was also antici-
pated depended on whether the structures defined by the 
preamble and paragraph (h) of the broadest claim of the 
second patent were present in the art device. Paragraph (h) 
recited 
clock means for operating [writing and applying functions] on a 
real time basis at a data transmission rate sufficiently greater than 
the frequency of the periodic power waveform that said applying 
means completely applies the decoded intensity level information 
to the selected display devices during the occurrence of each 
power waveform interval .... 
The Sixth Circuit differed sharply with the district court 
over the proper scope to be assigned to paragraph h in 
reversing as to the second patent. 56 
[T]he District Court's interpretation ... reads element h of Claim 
1 without regard to the specifications [sic] .... 
It is proper to construe element h in light of the specification 
because to do so does not alter or expand what is claimed, but 
rather explains it. ... The specifications explain the structure and 
materials used to provide the necessary means; they do not add a 
new element which is not found in the claims. Claims phrased in 
terms of "means" such as that used in the second patent are 
common, and could always be subject to a challenge for specificity 
if not construed to be limited to the structure recited in the spec-
ifications. Indeed, several courts have approved such a construc-
tion of "means" claims. See Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data 
Corp., 550 F.2d 992 [, 193 USPQ 257] (4th Cir. 1977); Hale Fire 
Pump Co. v. Tokai Ltd., 614 F.2d 1278 [, 205 USPQ 114] (CCPA 
1980). 
55 Pub. L. No. 97-164, Section 127(a), 96 Stat. 37-39 Apr. 2, 1982; codified at 
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295. 
56 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162 
(1983). 
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When we consider element h in light of the specifications it is 
clear that the [prior art device] did not anticipate the invention 
disclosed by the [second] patent .... 
Although the prior art system performed the same func-
tions recited in paragraph (h), the court continued, 
[t]he specifications make clear that the second patent uses a much 
different method ... than the [prior art].57 
The Sixth Circuit's decision not to invalidate claim 1 despite 
the recognition that the function recited in the means expres-
sion did not differ from that of the prior art, along with its 
citations to the Technitrol and Hale-Fire Pump cases, clearly 
indicate that the court determined the scope of the means 
expression through a rigorous application of the statutory 
language along the lines advocated in this article. 
On remand the district court in a second opinion again 
found the claim including element (h) invalid, this time as 
obvious over the prior device. 
On appeal from this second district court decision, a 
divided Federal Circuit reversed the District Court, accusing 
it of "ignor[ing] the law of the case" by refusing the interpret 
the scope of paragraph (h) narrowly according to the statu-
tory standard mandated by the Sixth Circuit. The district 
court's reuse of the broad interpretation it had used in the 
first decision, the Federal Circuit said, was 
contrary to the decision of the Sixth Circuit, and cannot be sus-
tained. The Sixth Circuit held that both the result achieved by the 
[second] patent, and the method of achieving it, differed from that 
of the [prior art] .... The prior appellate review and determina-
tion of certain issues, including claim construction, foreclosed the 
opportunity to re-determine those issues. Neither party has dem-
onstrated that the evidence presented on remand was substantially 
different, or that manifest injustice required an exception to the 
law of the case doctrine. 58 
The narrower scope of paragraph (h) was therefore rein-
stated, without further discussion of the legal merits of each 
57 Id. at 378,219 USPQ at 1169. 
58 767 F.2d at 1567-68,226 USPQ at 678-79 (citations omitted). 
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method of interpretation, and the claim was held valid over 
the prior art. 
The dissent stated: 
I do not agree that this court is bound by the law of the case on 
the basis of the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Stewart-Warner 
Corp. v. City ojPontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162 (1983) that 
the second patent is not invalid for anticipation. Although some 
deference must be given the Sixth Circuit, this should not be 
expanded to law of the case effect where the decision of the Sixth 
Circuit was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. 59 
The dissent went on to discuss the Sixth Circuit's interpre-
tation of the preamble, arguing that that interpretation was 
clearly erroneous. It urged that the second patent be found 
anticipated by the prior art system. 
It is clear from Stewart-Warner that the Federal 
Circuit assigned the means expression of element (h) a nar-
row scope in accordance with the statutory method of inter-
pretation. Somewhat less clear, however, are the method 
and the exact reasons used by that court to arrive at the 
decision to follow that direction of the statutory language. 
The majority of Stewart-Warner saw itself as bound 
under the law-of-the-case doctrine to the claim interpreta-
tion announced by the Sixth Circuit. However, as both they 
and the dissent recognized, prior Federal Circuit case law 
provides for exceptions to the binding effect of that doctrine. 
Central Soya Co. v. Hormel & CO.,60 the leading case on 
the law-of-the-case doctrine in the Federal Circuit, also 
involved a challenge in that court to the binding effect of a 
prior decision of a regional circuit court of appeals. In reject-
ing that challenge as barred by the doctrine, the Federal 
Circuit noted that if the earlier decision "was clearly erro-
neous and would work a manifest injustice' '61 the doctrine 
would not operate. 
The legal reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, although sound, 
appears to be contrary to the clear weight of prior law in 
59 Id. at 1592, 226 USPQ at 682. 
60 723 F.2d 1573, 220 USPQ 490 (1983). 
61 Id. at 1580, 220 USPQ at 495 (quoting from White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 
431 (5th Cir. 1967) ). 
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this area. As discussedabove,62 the use of the statutory 
method of interpretation to determine the scope of a means 
expression is contrary to a long line of cases in the CCP A 
dealing with prosecution proceedings, the authority of which 
continued to be controlling to the Court in Boersma. Assum-
ing that no valid difference between the choice of interpre-
tive methods in patentability and validity can be supported, 
these cases strongly suggest that the interpretation of the 
means expression in paragraph (h) made by the Sixth Circuit 
and given effect by the Federal Circuit in Stewart-Warner 
is contrary to the current rule. It is thus far from clear that 
the Sixth Circuit's claim interpretation was not clearly in 
error. 
Furthermore, the district court's two successive inval-
idations of the claim when the means expression was inter-
preted according to the established PTO approach suggest 
a strong possibility that the choice of interpretive method 
determined the outcome of the validity challenge in Stewart-
Warner. The failure to invalidate a claim due to a legally 
incorrect claim interpretation would seem to qualify as 
"manifest injustice." Under these circumstances, one would 
expect to encounter very serious doubts whether the ruling 
of the Sixth Circuit would be followed under the law-of-the-
case doctrine. 
Instead, the majority found this exception unavailable, 
devoting only a few brief remarks to the topic. The court 
did not cite any authority supporting the correctness of the 
Sixth Circuit's interpretation, and in fact did not even state 
that the interpretation was correct. Neither did it acknowl-
edge the prior case law to the contrary. 
Finally, in a very recent decision, the Federal Circuit 
explicitly adopted the statutory method of interpreting means 
expressions over an accused infringer's protestations. In 
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 the court addressed 
an appeal from a district court opinion holding seven of 
Polaroid's patents valid and infringed. 
62 See footnote 20, supra, and accompanying text. 
63 No. 86-604 (April 25, 1986), 
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One of the patents contained a claim which included a 
recitation of a 
first film-advancing means adapted to extend into [an] opening 
for engaging [the] foremost film unit at [the] second edge thereof 
and moving said foremost film unit, subsequent to exposure, through 
[the] exit.64 
The court described Kodak as arguing that "[t]he district 
court ... improperly limited the element 'first film-advanc-
ing means' ... to a preferred embodiment in the [patent] 
specification ... , and permitted that 'narrow' construction 
to dominate its analysis of the prior art. Kodak says that 
was contrary to § 112, which requires that means-pIus-func-
tion claims be construed to encompass 'equivalents', citing 
D.M.I., Inc. v. John Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1573,225 
USPQ 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985). It says prior art structures 
that perform the function of a 'first film advancing means' 
render obvious the inventions set forth in the claims .... ' '65 
Apparently, the Federal Circuit understood Kodak to argue 
that the means expression should be interpreted to include 
not only the corresponding structure in the specification of 
the patent, but also a range of equivalents wide enough to 
result in the traditional, broad interpretation that would be 
assigned under the PTO view, thus allowing the claim to be 
invalidated more easily. 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Kodak. 
[A]s stated in D.M.I., § 112 requires "that the limitation shall be 
construed to cover the structure described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof." 775 F .2d at 1574, 225 USPQ at 238 (emphasis 
in original). Here, as an initial matter, the district court properly 
construed "first film advancing means" in light of the structure 
described in the specification .... It went on to note, however, 
Polaroid's statement to the PTO during prosecution that the claims 
were limited to a rear pick that engaged the film unit ... only at 
the trailing 'edge.' ... Kodak has not shown error in the district 
court's finding that, in view of that prosecution history, it was 
compelled to read the claims as limited to a rear pick .... We will 
64 [d., slip op. at 34. 
65 [d., slip op. at 35. 
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not "undertake the speculative inquiry" into why the limitation 
was entered, or whether it was directed to one purpose Kodak 
alleges (i.e., "avoiding deflection of the leading end of the film 
unit out of alignment with the cassette's exit slot"), but not to 
others. C/. Kinzenbaw v. John Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389, 
222 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ , 
105 S. Ct. 1357 (1985). Thus, whether applied in determining 
validity or infringement, the broad scope argued in Kodak's brief 
would be inappropriate. 66 
The court thus explicitly adopted the statutory method 
of interpreting the means expression, in what appears to be 
a considered decision not to use the urged PTO paradigm. 
In doing so, it applied a precedent, the D.M.I. decision, 
which dealt exclusively with the question of how means 
expressions are to be interpreted during infringement, not 
validity, determinations. In its opinion, the court did not 
even acknowledge the existence of the numerous contrary 
binding precedents on the question, let alone suggest rea-
sons why they did not control the situation before the court. 
The observations lead one to wonder just how influen-
tial the quoted portion of Kodak will become in the future. 
On the one hand, the decision does appear to be another 
instance in which the Federal Circuit has applied the statu-
tory method of interpretation to a means expression in the 
context of patentability or validity. On the other hand, the 
opinion seems to evidence an unawareness of the near una-
nimity with which the court's precedents have come to the 
opposite conclusion. Moreover, the self-professed inability 
of the Federal Circuit to overturn its precedents through 
decisions of three-judge panels,67 such as that in Kodak, 
renders the ability of Kodak to overrule the precedential 
value of decisions such as Arbeit and Lundberg question-
able. 
66 ld., slip op. at 36 (citations to lower court decision omitted). 
67 See, e.g., SRllnternational v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 775 F.2d ll07, 
1125, 227 USPQ 577, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc action taken to overturn dicta 
in decision by prior three-judge panel). 
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IV. 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 
In view of the unsettled precedents from the Federal 
Circuit on this issue, and the meager discussion in those 
precedents of the policies involved, it is appropriate to 
examine in some detail the arguments supporting the use of 
both the PTO and statutory methods of interpretation. Such 
an examination is the only means by which a reasoned choice 
between the two alternatives can be made, and it is submit-
ted that such a reasoned choice will select the statutory 
standard. 
A. The Statutory Standard 
There are essentially two major reasons to strictly apply 
the language of section 112' s last paragraph to means expres-
sions during prosecution. First, the statutory language itself 
compels a strict application. The sixth paragraph of section 
112 directs what a claim including a means expression "shall 
be construed to cover." It does not expressly draw a dis-
tinction between the phases of prosecution and enforce-
ment,68 or between validity and infringement. The language 
facially includes a district court determining not only 
infringement, but validity as well, and also provides no basis 
for excluding the PTO from those who "shall" apply the 
statutory direction. In the absence of strong indications or 
policies to the contrary, the statute itself militates against 
the PTO's approach. . 
Second, applying the statutory language throughout the 
entire lifespan of a claim results in the claim being assigned 
a consistent scope. Under such an application, the bound-
aries of the subject matter defined by the claim are the same 
during the determination of both validity and infringement. 
Consequently, an apparatus that would have anticipated a 
claim, if it had been prior art, will infringe the claim after it 
issues. 
68 A discussion of the possible implications to be drawn from the presence of 
the word "cover" is reserved until later in this article. See text at notes 81-101, 
infra. 
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The PTO's approach does not produce such symmetry. 
Instead, the scope of a means expression during prosecution 
is radically different from its scope during infringement. To 
illustrate this, consider the following example. Assume that 
an applicant has initially presented a claim to the PTO incor-
porating a means expression that, if interpreted according 
to the statutory language, covers only novel and unobvious 
subject matter that he has enabled an ordinary artisan to 
make and use. Since there is no dispute as to the sixth 
paragraph's application in matters of infringement, if allowed 
his claim will enable him to exclude only those activities 
that patentees have traditionally held rights over. Let us 
further assume the not unreasonable existence of a prior art 
device which anticipates all the elements of the claim other 
than the disputed means expression, and is also capable of 
performing the function recited in the claim. However, this 
device does not meet one of the other two requirements of 
Graver Tank; either it does not perform the function in 
substantially the same way as the corresponding structure 
in our applicant's specification, or does not achieve the same 
result. The examiner properly performs his duty as inter-
preted by the PTO, and rejects the claim over the prior art, 
stating that he will not allow the claim as long as it continues 
to read on a function that the prior art device is capable of 
performing. 
The applicant here is faced with an unpalatable deci-
sion. The examiner in most cases could be satisfied by a 
substitution of structural limitations not found in the refer-
ence for the offending means expression. However, this runs 
the risk of depriving the applicant of at least some of the 
equivalents he originally sought, both because he is no longer 
using a means expression with its statutorily defined scope, 
and because he has just set up an unpleasant issue of pros-
ecution history estoppel precisely as to the element he sought 
to claim broadly. 
Alternatively, the applicant could more specifically recite 
the function to the point where the applied device could no 
longer perform it. While he retains in this latter case the 
equivalents provided by the statutory language, in narrow-
ing his function he has probably skewed the Graver Tank 
analysis to a point where he can no longer reach infringing 
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activities that he could have reached under his old claim 
language, either because the function now corresponds to a 
more elaborate structure in his specification than it did before, 
or because the elements in any accused device must now 
perform a more precise function. 
In either case, the result is that the applicant, once he 
becomes a patentee, no longer has an exclusive right of the 
same scope originally sought. Opponents will point out that 
this happens every time a claim is narrowed to avoid the 
prior art, but in this case the claim was already narrow 
enough to avoid being infringed by any prior art or obvious 
combination of prior art. 
The patent system generally reflects the policy decision 
that the public good will be advanced by granting an exclu-
sive right to an inventor covering any eligible subject matter 
that is both novel and unobvious. It is difficult to see how 
the further restriction of his patent rights within these stat-
utory boundaries in the above example furthers this policy 
in any way. To prevent an inventor from securing the full 
extent of the patent grant because of the unpatentability of 
subject matter he has not invented, and over which he is not 
seeking to obtain an exclusionary right, would seem to do 
violence to any orderly implementation of this policy. 
B. The PTO Standard 
Three arguments are usually brought forward to justify 
the PTO's liberal "reads on" test to means expressions. 
1. The most compelling argument in favor of the PTO' s 
method of interpretation is the long line of cases from the 
CCP A that have announced it and applied it since the '52 
Act became effective.69 Chief among these case are the Arbeit 
and Lundberg decisions discussed above. 
But the rationale of these cases is immediately trou-
bling. The Court in Lundberg argued that an application of 
the last paragraph to means expressions during prosecution 
would destroy a distinction between broad and narrow claims. 
69 E.g., In re Mott, 557 F.2d 266, 194 USPQ 305 (1977); In re Magaroli, et al., 
318 F.2d 348, 138 USPQ 158 (1963); In re Henatsch, 244 F.2d 542, 113 USPQ 530 
(1957); In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947, 99 USPQ 123 (1953). 
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In doing so, it ignored that paragraph's express direction 
that means expressions be construed to cover "the corre-
sponding structure ... and equivalents thereof. " Assuming 
that the corresponding structure has equivalents of some 
sort, the breadth of a means expression interpreted in accor-
dance with the statutory language will always be greater 
than that of a detailed recitation of the corresponding ele-
ment. The dispute is not as to whether such an expression 
is any broader than a detailed recitation of the exact struc-
ture, but rather how much broader it is. 
Courts faced with interpreting means expressions in 
infringement settings have been aware that that language 
affords a different, broader coverage as compared to struc-
tural recitations ofthe corresponding element,7° Contrary to 
the Court's assertion in Lundberg, an application of the 
statutory language to means expressions during prosecution 
would give the same result. 
More importantly, the court's observation in Lundberg 
and Arbeit that the claims themselves must define the inven-
tion without limitations imported from other sources begs 
the question to be answered. If the last paragraph of section 
112 determines the meaning assigned to a means expression 
during prosecution, then that expression already includes 
the corresponding structure and its equivalents. They are 
not "limitations in the specification not included in the claim"; 
they are part of the claim by virtue of their inclusion in the 
specification and they do not need to be "imported" into 
the claim to impart patentability. 
Conversely, if one initially decides that the sixth para-
graph will not govern such expressions during prosecution, 
and therefore the scope of the claim will be limited only by 
its literal language, it follows necessarily that the corre-
sponding structure and equivalents are not part of the claimed 
70 E.g., Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, supra, note 14; Lockheed 
Aircraft v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 193 USPQ 560 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Stearns v. 
Tinker & Rasor, supra, note 10; Courtesy Communications Corp. v. C-Five, Inc., 
455 F.Supp. 1183,203 USPQ 276 (N.D. TX 1978); Technicon Instruments Corp. 
v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 255 F.Supp. 630, 150 USPQ 227 (N.D. Ill. 1966), 
affd. 385 F.2d 391,155 USPQ 369 (7th Cir. 1967). 
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subject matter. But that is not a justification for making the 
decision in the first place. After all, changing the conclusion 
(the last paragraph does not apply) would erase the result 
relied on (the claim does not contain the needed limitations). 
Yet this is exactly what the Court used to justify its holding. 
Further, the rationale of these cases appears to conflict 
with another, related CCPA precedent. In In re Knowlton,71 
the CCPA was confronted with the PTO's rejection, under 
the first paragraph of section 112, of a claim drawn to a 
specifically programmed general purpose computer. The claim 
recited a series of means for performing the functions carried 
out by the particular program. In support of its rejection, 
the PTO stated that the claim would "preempt . . . every 
possible hardware configuration that would give the same 
result . . . notwithstanding the absence of an adequate 
teaching of any such hardware disclosure by [the] specifi-
cation. "72 
In its opinion, the Court embarked on a detailed dis-
cussion of section 112, and stated that the first paragraph 
requires, in part, a disclosure such that' 'the skilled artisan 
. . . sufficiently understand the manner of making and 
. . . using the invention .... The invention subject to scru-
tiny by the Patent Office ... is the invention defined by the 
claims .... " 
The Court then turned to a discussion of the last para-
graph of section 112 and its authorization of means expres-
sions. "If the applicant chooses to use such language, the 
statute instructs the ... Patent Office ... as to how such 
language shall be interpreted. It states that such language 
'shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure ... 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.' ''73 
Because the specification disclosed an apparatus that com-
plied with the claims, and the claims were in tum limited to 
covering that structure and its equivalents, the Court held 
that the disclosure was sufficiently enabling and reversed 
the rejection. 
71 481 F.2d 1357, 178 USPQ 486 (1973). 
72 ld. at 1362, 178 USPQ at 490. 
73 ld. at 1366, 178 USPQ at 492 (original emphasis omitted). 
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The continuing vitality of this view in the Federal Cir-
cuit was apparently reaffirmed by In re Hyatt, 74 in which 
the Court was faced with the rejection of a claim reciting 
only a single means. The Board of Appeals had affirmed the 
examiner's rejection under the second paragraph of section 
112, asserting that because of its single-means format, the 
claim failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
invention. 
The Court disagreed with the Board's application of the 
statute. 
The proper statutory rejection of a single means claim is the 
requirement of the first paragraph of section 112 that the enabling 
disclosure of the specification be commensurate in scope with the 
claim under consideration. 
The long-recognized problem with a single means claim is that it 
covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, 
while the specification discloses at most only those means known 
to the inventor. Thus, the claim is properly rejected ... based on 
the first paragraph of § 112. 7S 
This language at first appears to run counter to the 
limited scope assigned to means expressions during enable-
ment determinations in KnowLton. However, the court in 
Hyatt specifically limited its remarks. 
The final paragraph of § 112 saves combination claims drafted using 
means-plus-function format from this [enablement] problem by 
providing a construction of that format narrow enough to avoid 
the problem of undue breadth as forbidden by the first paragraph. 76 
The court therefore squarely reiterated the standard of 
interpretation described in KnowLton, with the proviso that 
it be applied to combination claims. 
It is very difficult to reconcile the reasoning applied in 
KnowLton and Hyatt with that of Arbeit and Lundberg. If 
the literal claim language defines the invention to be com-
pared to the prior art, as both Arbeit and Lundberg hold, 
why not require that same invention to be accompanied by 
74 708 F.2d 712,218 USPQ 195 (1983). 
75 [d. at 714,218 USPQ at 197 (footnote omitted). 
76 [d. at 715,218 USPQ at 197 (emphasis in original). 
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an enabling disclosure? On the other hand, if, as Knowlton 
and Hyatt hold, the applicant's duty to enable is restricted 
to the invention defined by the claims construed in accor-
dance with the last paragraph of section 112, what rationale 
could require the use of a different claimed invention for the 
purposes of applying sections 102 and 103? No reason is 
apparent, nor has any been suggested. 
2. The second argument urges that the PTO position is 
consistent with the well settled rule of claim construction 
giving claims during prosecution their' 'broadest reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the specification. "77 The gen-
eral reason behind this rule is that an applicant, within cer-
tain constraints, is able to amend his claim language as he 
pleases. Consequently, if he wishes to argue for a more 
restrictive interpretation of his claim language, his remedy 
is to so amend the claim and make the intended coverage 
explicit, rather than relying on nuance and disputed mean-
ings.78 Interpreting a means expression during prosecution 
to include all structures capable of performing the recited 
function, the argument continues, is simply to give the claim 
its broadest reasonable interpretation, in accordance with 
this time-tested rule. 
There are problems with this justification as well. As 
an initial matter, accepting the "broadest reasonable inter-
pretation" rule does not necessarily require acceptance of 
the PTO's interpretation of means expressions. 
Instead, it would be entirely consistent with the policies 
behind that rule to use the broadest reasonable interpreta-
tion of the claim construed according to the statutory lan-
guage. This would involve, for example, determining the 
broadest reasonable limits of the corresponding structure in 
the specification, whether the results achieved by the prior 
art can reasonably be considered the same as that achieved 
by the applicant's structure, and so on. The "broadest 
77 E.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,1404-05,163 USPQ 541,550 (CCPA 1969) 
and cases cited therein. 
78 E.g., In re Reuter, 651 F.2d 751,756,210 USPQ 249,253-54 (CCPA 1981); 
Prater at 1405, 162 USPQ at 550. 
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reasonable interpretation" rule, while persuasively arguing 
that the normal rules of claim interpretation should be altered 
during prosecution, is not sufficient to compel their trans-
formation into the PTO's test. It is not at all clear that 
interpreting a claim during prosecution according to an anal-
ysis that will never again be even remotely applied to it after 
issuance is reasonable. 
The support provided by this rationale falls short for 
another, more fundamental reason. Unlike the case where 
the "broadest reasonable interpretation" rule is applied to 
claims literally reciting the structure comprising the element 
claimed, the example discussed above79 points out that the 
patent applicant using a means expression may not be free 
to amend his claim to the extent necessary to avoid the prior 
art applied under the PTO test. Forced to address prior art 
disclosures during prosecution having no proximity what-
soever to the boundaries of infringement, an applicant may 
be unable to avoid relinquishing valuable and deserved 
exclusive rights. 
Finally, even if one were to accept the "broadest 
reasonable interpretation" rule as adequate support for the 
PTO's approach to means expressions, it provides no sup-
port for the use of that approach when determining the 
validity of an already issued patent. Absent a reissue or 
reexamination proceeding, a patentee has no ability to alter 
his claim language to make his intended scope of protection 
clearer. Consequently, the basis for the rule disappears. 
In fact, the Federal Circuit has on at least one occasion 
stated that issued claims are to be construed, if possible, so 
as to preserve their validity. 80 This view is in direct oppo-
sition to use of the "broadest reasonable interpretation" 
rule after issuance. 
3. The third argument urges that the PTO's interpre-
tation more accurately reflects the intent behind the statute. 
In other words, the last paragraph of section 112 was not 
intended to apply to prosecution. As evidence of this, ref-
79 Page 267. 
80 Carman Industries, Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937, 220 USPQ 481, 485 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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erence is usually made to a brief portion of P. J. Federico's 
commentary on the '52 Act, in which he states that the last 
paragraph of section 112 
relates primarily to the construction of. . . claims for the purpose 
of determining when the claim is infringed (note the use of the 
word "cover"), and would not appear to have much, if any, 
applicability in determining the patentability of such claims over 
the prior art, that is, the Patent Office is not authorized to allow a 
claim which "reads on" the prior art.Sl 
Since Mr. Federico was one of the primary authors of the 
'52 Act, this passage is argued to authoritatively reveal what 
was intended by that paragraph. 
Again, serious problems appear in this argument. Gen-
erally, "the test most often declared by the courts" is "that 
the legislative will governs decisions on the construction of 
statutes. ' '82 Questions of statutory construction are decided 
according to the criteria of what the legislature intended the 
language of the particular measure under scrutiny to mean.83 
Some cases use maxims of interpretation, such as the 
"plain meaning rule,"84 or other formulistic approaches to 
this essentially factual inquiry. However, probably the most 
useful synthesis of the case law is one which views all the 
evidence available, including the language of the statute, its 
legislative history, and the policies behind it, in light of the 
degree to which each piece is probative of the legislature's 
actual intent and the strength with which each argues for a 
particular interpretation. 85 
As argued above, 86 the language of the last paragraph 
of § 112 appears clear on its face. That clarity argues strongly 
81 Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1,26, (1954 ed.). 
82 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984). 
83 E.g., Philbrook v. Glopgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 
458 (1974). 
84 See generally 2A Sutherland, § 46.01. 
85 E.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. S.E.c., 119 F.2d 730,738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
314 U.S. 618 (1941). See U.S. v. National Marine Engineer's Beneficial Associa-
tion, 294 F.2d 385, 391 (2d Cir. 1961). 
86 Page 266. 
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that the legislature intended to enact a measure that would 
govern the interpretation of claims both during validity and 
infringement. Although Mr. Federico apparently would have 
had us believe otherwise, the word "cover" in common 
parlance is not associated solely with infringement deter-
minations, as for example in the statement: "The claim is 
not patentable because it is broad enough to cover subject 
matter that would have been obvious to one of ordinary 
skill. " Few would agree that the term' 'invention," as used 
in 35 U .S.C. §§ 102 and 103, means the invention "covered 
by the claim. "87 
As also argued above, no rational policy behind the 
patent system is served by applying the PTO's interpretation 
to means expressions. 
Among the other factors to be considered is the legis-
lative history surrounding the '52 Act, including Mr. Fed-
erico's commentary, which has been argued by some to 
support the PTO's interpretation. However, a reasoned review 
of this material shows the support to be largely illusory. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Federico's commentary is not 
part of the legislative history of the ' 52 Act. During the 
legislative activities leading to the Act's passage, Mr. Fed-
erico was a Patent Office employee working with the House 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights.88 
He was not an elected member of Congress, nor did he, in 
his function as commentator for West Publishing's United 
States Code Annotated, speak for any portion of the legis-
lative branch. 
As he states, his commentary was prepared "after the 
new patent act ['52 Act] was approved," and "is a consid-
eration and revision of ... transcriptions of address[es to] 
87 In re Muchmore, 433 F.2d 824,826,167 USPQ 681,683 (CCPA 1970) (affirm-
ing rejection under 103). E.g., Julie Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Guideline 
Instruments, Inc., SOl F.2d 1131, 1135, 183 USPQ I, 4 (2d Cir. 1974) (claim 
including means expression invalidated under 103); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 
640 F.2d 1193, 1210, 205 USPQ 381, 392 (Ct. CI. 1980) (claim invalidated under 
102(b) ). 
88 G. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952? 
reprinted in J. Witherspoon, Nonobviousness-The Ultimate Condition of Patent-
ability 1: 1,3-5 (1978). 
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various patent groups. "89 Its full text was therefore not even 
in existence when the legislature considered the measure, 
and can hardly be probative of the intent in the minds of 
legislators at that time. As stated by Professor Singer, no 
method of statutory interpretation "can be supported when 
[it] result[s] in a finding of legislative intent which did not in 
fact exist within the legislature."90 
The mistaken authority given to Mr. Federico's com-
mentary seems to stem from a confusion between his status 
as a textual author of the '52 Act's provisions, and the 
legislator's status as legal authors in voting on it. It is the 
intent of the legislators which is at issue in statutory inter-
pretation, and Mr. Federico's commentary, to the extent 
that it is more relevant than any other person's views, must 
trace its authority to that source. 
It has been often stated that the later views expressed 
by a legislator concerning the intent behind a statute are not 
sufficiently probative of legislative intent. 91 The courts, 
including the CCPA, have recognized that, a fortiori, the 
post-enactment views expressed by "a draftsman of the 
legislation" are "of little value in the interpretation of [a] 
statute. "92 
89 Commentary, 35 U.S.C.A. at 1-2. 
90 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984). 
91 E.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 
n.13 (1980); U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947); Rogers v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); 
Allyn v. U.S., 461 F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1972); U.S. School of Aeronautics v. U.S., 
142 F.Supp. 933, 938 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 
(1982). 
92 Department of Energy v. Westland, 565 F.2d 685, 690-91, 196 USPQ 3, 7 
(CCPA 1977). E.g., Iowa State Research Foundation, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 
444 F.2d 406, 170 USPQ 394 (4th Cir. 1970) (specific to Mr. Federico's commen-
tary); Friedman v. U.S., 364 F. Supp. 484, 488 (S.D. Ga. 1973); California Welfare 
Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F.Supp. 491 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Epstein 
v. Rasor, 296 F. Supp 214, 216 (N. D. Calif. 1969); 2A Sutherland, § 48.12. "I 
believed the worst person to construe [a statute] is the person who is responsible 
for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with 
the effect of the language which has in fact been employed. At the time he drafted 
the statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given 
full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards 
just because what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was 
not done." Hilder v. Dexter, AC 474 (1902). Cf Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102 n.13 (1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 
F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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Moreover, Mr. Federico adds the disclaimer: 
In such an extended discussion it is. obviously impossible to avoid 
expressions . . . of personal opinion and it should be understood 
that the paper [commentary] contains some opinions and views of 
the writer even though not always labelled as such.93 
We therefore cannot even be sure whether any given portion 
of his commentary represents his view of what the legisla-
ture intended, or instead is his personal opinion of what the 
particular language ought to mean.94 
On the other hand, the House Report discussing the 
bill95 was drafted by Mr. Federico for that body and adopted 
by it. It can therefore be considered more highly probative 
of the legislature's intent. The text of the Report refers to 
Section 112 in only one sentence: 
The next group of sections [Chapter 11] relates to the application 
for a patent. 96 
The text does not specifically mention the last paragraph of 
§112 at all. Clearly, it enunciates no view ofthe paragraph's 
effect on prosecution corresponding to the PTO's reading 
of Mr. Federico's commentary. 
The Senate Report97 is nearly identical to that of the 
House, differing only in a matter not relevant to this discus-
sion.98 
The Revision Notes accompanying the House Report, 
also written by Mr. Federico, do specifically mention the 
disputed paragraph. The entire passage reads: "A new para-
graph relating to functional claims is added.' '99 
None of these "official" materials contains the slightest 
evidence of the intent supposedly referred to by Mr. Fed-
erico in his unofficial commentary. By failing to even men-
93 Commentary, 35 V.S.C.A. at 2. 
94 It has even been intimated that no legislative intent adhered to much of the 
'52 Act. Congressional Intent at 1:12-13. 
95 H. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1952), reprinted at 34 J.P.O.S. 
549 (1952). 
96 34 J.P.O.S. at 557. 
97 S. Rep. No. 1979, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1952), reprinted in 1952 V.S. Code 
Congo & Ad. News 2394. 
98 Congressional Intent at 1: 10, n.16. 
99 34 J.P.O.S. at 591. 
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tion the effect he asserts, they argue instead that Congress 
did not intend that the PTO interpretation result, and that 
that interpretation was made by Mr. Federico sometime 
after the bill's enactment. 
This view finds further support from another of the 
statute's coauthors, C. J. Zinn, who also commented on 
the'52 Act. 100 He states that the paragraph 
recognizes the validity of combination claims wherein the novelty 
is expressed in functional terms. It offsets the theory of the Hal-
liburton case but does not go so far as to permit the use of single 
means claims. 101 
Mr. Zinn's commentary does not assert any difference 
between the paragraph's application to infringement and 
prosecution. 
In short, Mr. Federico's commentary is the only source 
discussing the statutory language that even remotely sug-
gests any validation of the PTO's interpretation. Its citation 
on this point is some evidence of the interpretation Mr. 
Federico thought the language should have had some time 
after the enactment of the paragraph. However, it is exceed-
ingly thin evidence of Congress's intent in enacting that 
language. 
Finally, the language ofMr. Federico's commentary is 
itself equivocal. He states that the paragraph relates "pri-
marily" to infringement. Does this mean that, in spite ofthe 
seemingly express language ofthat paragraph, it relates only 
to infringement? Or does it instead indicate that the para-
graph "secondarily" relates to matters before the PTO, 
reflecting Mr. Federico's view that overturning Halliburton 
is its most important, but not only, function? 
He states that the paragraph' 'would not appear to have 
much applicability" to proceedings before the PTO (empha-
sis added), instead of stating that the paragraph definitely 
does not apply. Does this indicate that the statement is one 
of personal opinion rather than the intent he perceived to be 
behind the legislation? What is his authority for the assertion 
100 Commentary on New Title35, U.S. Code "Patents", reprinted in 1952 U.S. 
Code Congo & Ad. News 2509. 
101 [d. at 2514. 
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that "the Patent Office is not authorized to allow a claim 
which 'reads on' the prior art?" Certainly that result does 
not stem from any language in the paragraph under discus-
sion. If it finds a basis in some other portion of the statute, 
it is odd that the statement should appear at this point, 
without even a cross reference to the specific supporting 
language. 
In sum, the reasons advanced in support of the PTO's 
method of interpreting means expressions do not appear to 
be well-grounded. They are based, in the case of the early 
decisions of Arbeit and Lundberg, on an incomplete and 
incoherent understanding of how the relevant statutory pro-
visions function. In the case of arguments using the' 'broad-
est reasonable interpretation" or similar rules, they evi-
dence an insufficient appreciation of the costs that are imposed· 
on patent owners by the lack of symmetry inherent in the 
PTO's method. Mr. Federico's commentary fails to support 
the PTO's method for two reasons. First, it is not proper 
legislative history. Second, it does not even, by its own 
terms, assert that the legislative history of the '52 Act requires 
an application of the PTO method. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the Federal 
Circuit has failed to come to grips with this problem ade-
quately. As a result, even after reviewing the recent Federal 
Circuit decisions on the point, the patent bar is essentially 
unable to predict what method of interpretation that court 
will use to determine the scope of a means expression being 
compared against the prior art. 
The lack of any discussion of the policies underlying 
this issue, and the failure of the court to confront its binding 
precedents in the published opinions, has created uncer-
tainty whether the Federal Circuit is discarding the ques-
tionable precedents of Arbeit and Lundberg. Arbeit and 
Lundberg dealt with pre-grant patentability determinations, 
not the post-grant validity determinations in RCA, Stewart-
Warner and Kodak. Do the treatments of the means expres-
sions in Stewart-Warner and Kodak indicate that the Federal 
Circuit does not feel its earlier precedents extend to this 
area of its jurisdiction, and that the statutory rule of inter-
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pretation should apply? Yet the adoption of such a funda-
mental difference in claim interpretation between validity 
and prosecution would seem to be both intellectually unsound 
and unprecedented. Or perhaps the language in Mulder, a 
case involving a pending application, indicates that the cor-
rectness of the early precedents is being called into ques-
tion? 
Patent practitioners will have to await an explicit treat-
ment of the issue in a published opinion to determine whether 
the Federal Circuit will continue to use the strained, overly 
restrictive interpretation of the last paragraph of section 112 
based on highly questionable precedents, or whether the 
court's increasing familiarity with the interpretation given 
means expressions in infringement determinations and the 
practical benefits of symmetrical claim interpretation will 
lead it to throw off the unwarranted vestiges of pre-1952 
case law in this area. 
EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers may wish to consider the impact, if 
any, of In re Yamamoto, 222 USPQ 934,936 (Fed. 1984) on the 
author's discussion of the PTO position appearing at pp. 268-273 
above. Following the Prater and Reuter decisions there men-
tioned, the Federal Circuit rejected appellant's argument which 
would require the PTO to apply a rule of claim construction adopted 
by the federal courts when the validity of an issued patent is in 
question. Instead, the Court affirmed "the board's decision to 
give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, consistent 
with the specification, in reexamination proceedings." 
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